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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In this paper we investigate the determinants of student performance in 
mathematics and dictation tests among fourth-grade school children in Indonesia. 
We use a unique dataset of school and student information that was collected in a 
nationally representative survey of 110 public schools in 8 Indonesian provinces in 
2003. Using an OLS regression technique that compensates for heteroskedasticity, 
we conduct separate sets of student-level regressions for three performance 
variables: math scores, dictation scores and combined scores. We found that 
student performance is strongly influenced by individual variables, teacher variables 
and school variables. Among the significant variables are the education level of 
parents; student-teacher ratio; quality of school facilities and teacher absence rate. 
We also discuss the policy implications of the results. 
 
Key words: absenteeism; primary school; achievement. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Over recent decades there has been a massive effort by developing countries, 
sometimes with assistance from international aid agencies, to put their children in 
school. Educational attainment, especially primary education, is perceived as one of 
the main vehicles to improve living standards in developing countries and to spur on 
nation-wide economic growth. 
 
Given the vast resources invested in education, understanding what factors and 
investments most efficiently improve student learning is of crucial importance. This 
paper takes a first step toward that goal in the case of Indonesia. Surprisingly, given 
Indonesia’s size and importance, few studies have investigated the determinants of 
student achievement. In this paper, we use a new unique nationally representative 
dataset that includes not only student performance data, from math and dictation 
tests that we administered, but also data on the students’ teachers and schools. The 
results are cross-sectional and hence cannot easily be used to establish causal 
relationships, but they do highlight some potentially important correlations between 
performance and the factors that may be amenable to policy interventions. 
 
A. Measuring the Quality of Education 
 
After achieving success in universal primary education, the next logical step would be 
to evaluate other aspects of schooling, particularly the quality of schools and 
teaching. One way of determining the quality of teaching in schools is by looking at 
the intermediate outcome of student performance (Sanders, 1999). There are several 
ways to evaluate a student’s “quality” attributable to formal education, but the most 
tractable indicator is how he or she performs in tests (World Bank, 2003). 
 
There are, howevers, important caveats to using testing as a measure the quality of 
schooling : students’ “output quality” depends very much on their input quality. 
Strong performance may simply reflect the student’s innate ability or prior 
preparation, rather than the school’s contribution. So in other words, gauging the 
quality of schools depends on measuring how much learning value is added to a 
student who enrolls in a particular school. In order to establish how much value is 
added, we need data on student performance prior to entering a particular school or 
grade, but in this study, we lack baseline pre-enrollment test scores. We do include 
some variables that are likely to capture some aspects of student preparation or 
ability, but with this cross-sectional data, our primary focus will be on establishing 
correlations to assist in  understanding student performance in Indonesia. As we do 
so, we should keep in mind our underlying interest in value-adding. 
 
As mentioned above, there is an absolute advantage of using tests as an indicator of 
school quality: it is an objective indicator. This is especially true in government-
administered tests at a national level, because schools or teachers cannot give a 
student high or low marks based on personal preferences or for other purposes such as 
securing extra funding or increasing school prestige. Test results are also highly 
reliable, because each student will get the result that corresponds to his or her 
abilities, especially abilities that are taught and trained in formal educational 
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institutions. Moreover, national standardized tests enable the government to 
objectively evaluate one school’s level of quality relative to other schools in other 
provinces around the country. 
 
There are, however, also disadvantages with using tests as an evaluation tool: 
teachers may be tempted to teach to the test and ignore subjects that are not tested 
(World Bank, 2003). This is especially true if the test dates and materials are 
already known in advance. Moreover, there can still be attempts to manipulate 
results. Thirdly, student-specific skills such as family background and 
socioeconomic conditions, access to facilities and inherent skills are perceived and 
have been proven in some studies to have significant roles in determining a 
student’s performance in tests. 
 
B. Background on Education Policy in Indonesia 
 
Indonesia has two kinds of public primary schools. The first is called Madrasah 
Ibtidaiyah Negeri (MIN). MIN schools are overseen by the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs and use a curriculum designed by the department that is based on Islam; in 
other words, MI schools are religious schools. The second category of schools are 
non-MI schools, or regular public schools, to avoid any confusion due to diverse 
names given to these schools. Two of the more popular names for regular public 
schools are SDN (Sekolah Dasar Negeri or Public Primary Schools) and SD Inpres 
(SD Instruksi Presiden or Presidential Instruction Primary Schools).2 Regular schools 
are supervised by the Ministry of National Education, and they use a more secular 
curriculum; religion is only one of the courses, rather than serving as the curriculum’s 
foundation. In addition to these two categories of public schools, Indonesia also has 
private primary schools, known as SDS (Sekolah Dasar Swasta) and MIS (Madrasah 
Ibtidaiyah Swasta). 
 
In January 2001 the government enacted a major regional autonomy law, which has 
had a substantial impact on the education sector. From an organizational standpoint, 
since 2001, regular public schools have been controlled and supervised by district 
governments, although they are still using the curriculum designed by the Ministry of 
National Education at the national level. By contrast, the religious (MI) public 
schools are still under the same organizational structure as prior to 2001. Moreover, 
education decentralization means that school management has been handed down 
directly to the schools themselves, officially called Manajemen Berbasis Sekolah 
(School-based Management). This means individual schools have the authority to 
manage the available facilities, manage human resources affairs and involve 
stakeholders in the delivery of education. This new initiative is supported by two new 
independent institutions: Dewan Pendidikan (Education Boards), which operate at 
                                                
2 SD Inpres is a name given to schools that were constructed during a massive national school building 
campaign in the 1970s, based on President Soeharto’s instruction, which explains the origin of the 
moniker “Presidential Instruction”. Around 60,000 primary schools were built around the country in 
that era. The effect of this policy is discussed in Duflo (2001). 
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the kabupaten/kota level, and Komite Sekolah (School Committees), which conduct 
activities at the school level.3 
 
By developing-country standards, basic education is widespread in Indonesia. In 1984 
the government implemented a 6-year Compulsory Education program for the first 
time, which proved highly successful: by 1988, 99.6% of children were either enrolled 
in primary schools or had finished the six years of compulsory education 
(Government of Indonesia, 1997/1998). In 1994, the Compulsory Education program 
was renamed the Basic Education Program and was extended into a 9-year program, 
which requires students to remain in school until they graduate from junior high 
school (or grade 9). The target had been to put everybody aged 6 to 15 in school by 
1998, but the economic crisis of 1997 led the government to shift the target date to 
2008. Then in 2000 the government ratified UNESCO’s Education for All 2015 
program that was signed in Dakar, which commits Indonesia to reduce adult illiteracy 
by 5% and provide basic education for all children by 2015 (Sudjarwo, 2003). In 
2003, the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) passed a new National 
Education System law, replacing legislation that had taken effect in 1989.4  
 
C. Purpose of Study 
 
Between late 2002 and early 2003, there were heated discussions on the National 
Education System law as it was being debated in parliament, and one of the more 
popular topics was the poor performance of Indonesian students. What was missing 
from these arguments however, was the evidence to support claims regarding the lack 
of quality among students, especially quantitative evidence; the proof of whether a 
link exists between student quality and teaching quality in Indonesia, as has been 
proven in other countries; and, if the link does exist, what kind of influence teaching 
quality has on student quality. 
 
This paper explores the determinants of performance in tests of Indonesian fourth-
grade students in public schools in detail, and gauges how decisive factors like teacher 
quality and school facilities are in determining test results, compared to student-
specific factors such as parents’ level of education. Since this paper only aims to 
provide a basic explanation of the determinants of student performance, the best this 
paper can do is explain whether student performance is a good indicator of the 
quality of a school and teaching and, if teacher quality and school facilities are 
significant, what policy measures can be taken by stakeholders to improve student 
performance. 
                                                
3 Although both bodies have generic names, these are the official names. Dewan Pendidikan is the 
body that enables the community where schools are located to participate and assume responsibilities 
in school management and policies. Although they work with government agencies, they are 
independent and have their own authority according to the laws in their specific regions. As already 
mentioned, they operate at the kabupaten/kota level. On the other hand, Komite Sekolah operate at 
the school level, and they have similar functions to BP3 (for an explanation of BP3, see section IV). 
See http://www.dewanpendidikan.or.id for more details (note – this website is in Indonesian). 
4 This new law, UU No. 20/2003, replaced UU No. 2/1989. While the legislation changed, the 
government regulations that govern its implementation have not been replaced; and as a result, the 
new law operates under the same government regulations as previously.  
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It should be stressed that while it tries to identify the major correlates of student 
performance, this paper does not pass judgment on whether quality of schools and 
teaching in Indonesia is “acceptable”, relative to potential or to international 
standards.5 Also, since the data were collected through a survey conducted in 2003 
and no studies using similar instruments were conducted before 2001, this study 
cannot conclude whether the quality of education has changed, for better or for 
worse, due to decentralization.6 
 
Another contribution of this analysis is that in addition to the usual explanatory 
variables, we include the teacher absence rate. Only a handful of recent studies 
regarding teacher absenteeism have tried to include teacher absence as an 
explanatory variable, because until recently good data on absenteeism was 
unavailable. This variable may provide us with valuable insight regarding the 
determination of student performance. 
 
Other than this paper, we only found one recent paper on this topic: Mohandas 
(2000), which discusses performance in junior secondary schools, in addition to an 
older paper (Johnstone & Jiyono, 1983).7 Thus, this is the first paper to our 
knowledge in at least two decades that provides the correlates of student performance 
in primary schools in Indonesia. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter II discusses the survey where 
data was collected. Chapter III provides a literature review of determining student 
achievement. Chapter IV explains the model used for this investigation and data 
summary. Chapter V discusses the results. Chapter VI provides conclusions and 
policy implications. 
                                                
5 It is subject to debate whether there exists an acceptable level or not in measuring quality of 
education. 
6 The regional autonomy laws were enacted in 2001, which among other things transferred budget 
allocation authority, including health and education spending, to local governments. 
7 Other older papers include Elley (1976), Mangindaan et al. (1978), and Moegiadi et al. (1979) that 
were referenced in Mohandas (2000). 
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II. DATA 
 
 
The data for this study were collected through a health and education provider survey 
conducted by the World Bank in cooperation with SMERU Research Institute. The 
main objective of the survey was to collect data on the condition of primary schools 
and public health centers. The survey was part of a multicountry survey that also 
included Bangladesh, Ecuador, India, Peru, and Uganda.  
 
The survey had three objectives: to document every health and education provider-
related issue; to gain an understanding of the differences in the characteristics 
between districts as well as between primary schools and public health centers; and to 
allow assessments of the differences in quality and quantity of service delivery across 
countries, with the focus on the impact of regional autonomy, public participation, 
labor policies and income. Data collection in Indonesia took place during two 
separate rounds, in October 2002 and February 2003. Each school was visited twice to 
improve the accuracy of the estimates on variables (such as teacher absence), as well 
as to gauge the similarity of the responses from the two visits, thus giving us a better 
understanding of the nature of the existing problems. 
 
In Indonesia, as in the other countries in the study, the sample was a stratified, 
clustered, nationally representative random sample. The Indonesia data were 
collected from eight provinces chosen randomly: Banten, West Java, Central Java, 
East Java, Bengkulu, Riau, West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) and Southern Sulawesi. 
After stratification of the country into four regions, a total of 10 districts were 
chosen randomly on a probability-proportionate-to-population basis: five urban 
districts (Cilegon, Bandung, Surakarta, Pasuruan and Pekanbaru) and five rural 
districts (Gowa, Lombok Tengah, Rejang Lebong, Magelang and Tuban). In each 
district, 10 villages were chosen at random, and in the chosen villages up to three 
primary schools were surveyed at random with at least one private and one public 
school being included. For public health centers, 10 were chosen at random from 
each district. 
 
The questionnaire in the survey aimed to obtain information at three levels: the 
facility level, individual level and national level. The facility level included the size 
of the facility; number of employees; operating hours; employees’ activities when 
visited by the enumerators; types of services available (for public health centers); 
remoteness; public participation; average education level of the patients and students’ 
parents; supervision; financial condition; employees’ education background and the 
availability of supporting facilities. At the individual level, the survey covered means 
of transportation used by the employees to get to the facilities; the relationship 
between the employee and the surrounding area; employees’ rank in the facilities; 
demographic characteristics; mother tongue and ethnic background; work-related 
education; marital status and number of children; other sources of income; work 
experience; salary payment method; his or her motivation for choosing a particular 
occupation and their level of satisfaction. Lastly, at the national level the 
questionnaire included the different positions in the facility, number of employees 
and qualifications; tolerated absenteeism level among employees; policies regarding 
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appointment, placement and transfer of employees; employees’ participation in 
facility management; private sector service and condition of private facilities; reward 
and sanction systems; stakeholder participation in policies and employees’ union. 
 
The student-performance data used for this paper were collected during the second 
visit to each school in February 2003. Enumerators administered a brief interview and 
test to a randomly selected sample of 10 students from the fourth grade in 110 public 
schools, yielding a total sample of 1,089 students. Almost all schools had only one 
fourth-grade cohort. Although there might be warranted suspicion that the students 
did not take the tests seriously due to their irrelevance for the students’ grades in 
school, the enumerators reported and documented that the students seemed to take 
the tests very seriously. The test instruments are in Appendix 5. 
 
This analysis only includes government schools (SDN and MIN), in part because 
most primary schools across the country are government-run, so students in 
government-run schools can serve as the best proxy for the country.8 Moreover, 
government-run schools generally have similar organizational structures and are 
subject to a strict standardized national curriculum; these commonalities may make it 
easier to distinguish the effects on performance of differences in school management 
and family background factors. More explanation regarding the data is available in 
section IV.2 and IV.3. 
                                                
8 According to data released in 2003 by the Department of National Education, 93% of primary school 
students are enrolled in public schools (DNE, 2003). 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Many studies have related student performance to various aspects of education such 
as the quality of a school, quality of teaching, teacher remuneration, class size and 
student gender, to mention several widely used factors. The main problem in relating 
these aspects is that the non-measurable outputs may be as important as the 
measurable ones. There are also some concerns about the fact that students are 
taught by more than one teacher, making it difficult to link the performance of a 
particular student to a particular teacher (Kingdon & Teal, 2002). 
 
A study on schools in India investigated the relationship between performance-
related pay and student achievement (Kingdon & Teal, 2002), addressing the 
important issue of endogeneity in the relationship between pay and achievement. In 
the study, the writers discussed two issues: an earnings function for teacher’s pay and 
a production function for student achievement. The authors found strong evidence 
that performance-related pay in the private sector impacts on student achievement, 
but no evidence of a similar cause-effect relationship in public schools. 
 
A study in OECD countries on the role of deviations in students’ characteristics to 
their performance showed that students whose parents (especially mothers) have 
high school certificates or higher qualifications perform better than their peers 
(OECD, 2001). Family affluence is also a very decisive factor, although students in 
less affluent families in some OECD countries perform better than the OECD average 
(OECD, 2001). The study itself discussed many other differences in student 
characteristics and background that may contribute to differences in student 
performance such as gender, family socioeconomic status, culture, language spoken at 
home and family structure. 
 
Another comparative study on public schools among states in the United States 
found that in Tennessee, smaller class sizes contribute positively to student learning, 
particularly in fields like elementary reading (Darling-Hammond, 2000). The studies 
on class size are not limited to public schools, as another study found that there is a 
consistent negative relationship between student-teacher ratio and the average 
examination results in UK private schools (Graddy & Stevens, 2003). 
 
A study in secondary schools in Bangladesh however, (Asadullah, 2002) found an 
insignificant positive sign on the class size variable in determining student 
achievements using both OLS and IV regressions. The author concluded by 
suggesting that a reduction in class size is not useful in a developing country like 
Bangladesh. Moreover, other studies on class sizes found that small class sizes are 
either not significant or even detrimental to student performance (Hanushek, 1995; 
Angrist & Lavy, 1999; Urquiola, 2001; and Hoxby, 2000a). In addition, a review of 
277 econometric studies further emphasized the inconsistency of the effect of class 
size on achievement when it stated that 28% of the studies report statistically 
significant estimates but 13% of those report a statistically significant negative sign 
(Jones, 2001). 
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Other studies stated that teachers are the most important influence on student 
progress, even more important than socioeconomic status and school location 
(Archer, 1999 and Armentano, 2003) that found that teacher qualifications are more 
important than class size. One study (Darling-Hammond, 2000) concluded that 
measures of teacher preparation and certification are by far the strongest correlates of 
student achievement in reading and mathematics. 
 
Another important and generally consistent finding is that girls usually perform better 
than boys. This result is true for developing countries like Malawi (UNICEF, 2003), 
where UNICEF interviewed teachers regarding performance of female students, and 
more developed countries like Australia and New Zealand (Buckingham, 1999 and 
2003). According to the study in Australia, this is related to the fact that boys’ 
performance has been declining over the past decade while girls’ performance has 
improved. Australian girls are now 11% more likely than boys to complete grade 12, 
and in the 1998 New South Wales HSC the average mark for girls was higher than 
boys in 64 out of 70 subjects. Moreover, boys’ scores tend to be clustered at the top and 
the bottom while girls’ are closer to the middle. Another statistical investigation by the 
same author (Buckingham, 2003) offered some explanations by mentioning that there 
is a diminishing presence of men in boys’ daily lives; and the fact that there has been a 
‘feminization’ of schools in Australia for the past two decades, which means that 
curriculum and assessments now suit girls more than boys. 
 
There are also several studies that discussed peer effects on student achievement. The 
results indicate that peer achievements have a positive effect on achievement 
growth. On the other hand, the variance in their achievements appears to have no 
effect (Hanushek et al., 2001). Another study (Hoxby, 2000b) that used two methods 
in looking at the effects of peers with different gender and racial groups in Texan 
primary schools also found that students are affected by the performance of their 
peers. For instance, the study found evidence that both male and female test scores in 
math and reading improve by increasing the share of females in a class. On the other 
hand, the effects of an increase in a racial group in a class are not as convincing as 
gender with only one or two race groups being significant, and peers in the same 
racial group experience the effects highest. Moreover, this study also found that racial 
origin of peer achievement is not important, except within racial groups. 
 
As we already mentioned in section I.3, we found only one recent paper on this topic 
that was written using Indonesian data. Mohandas (2000) used the result of 1997 
TIMSS (Third International Mathematics and Science Study) instruments in 
measuring the mathematics and science achievements of junior secondary students. 
The paper found that the sex (boys constantly outperformed girls), age and 
background of students were significant student-level determinants of achievement. 
The other paper (Johnstone & Jiyono, 1983), which tested student achievement in 
language and mathematics in rural and semiurban Yogyakarta, found that background 
is more important than students’ individual characteristics and attitudes towards 
school, and family encouragement is more important than family wealth or 
socioeconomic conditions. Furthermore, out-of-school factors were found to affect 
language scores most and math scores least, which means teacher absence should 
have a greater effect on mathematics than language aptitude. 
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IV. THE MODEL AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
A. The Model 
 
The model for student performance adopted in this study follows a common firm 
production function, which was also used by Kingdon & Teal (2002). Appendix 1 
documents the description of the variables. 
 
Ln Sij = α0 + α1 Gij + α2 Q
P
ij + α3 Ln Q
T
j + α4 Ln Q
S
j + α5 Ln F
S
j + uij  
 
where Sij is the score in math and dictation tests of the i
th student in the jth school, 
and it is determined by Gij, the sex of a student; Q
P
ij, a matrix of the characteristics of 
a student’s parents; QTj, a matrix of the teacher’s characteristics in the jth school; Q
S
j, a 
matrix of the quality of the jth school; and F
S
j, any fees received by the jth school from 
both the government and the parents; while uij is the error term in the model. District 
variables are added into the model to serve as an indicator of whether there are 
fundamental differences among districts. 
 
Sij consists of three types of scores - math, dictation and a combination of both - and 
they will be estimated individually. The tests, which consisted of the same set of 
questions for each student, were administered by our enumerators. The first figure is 
SCOREMATH, which is the raw score from the math test that consisted of thirteen 
basic problems (addition, subtraction, multiplication, division). The second figure is 
SCOREWORD, which is the raw score from the dictation test. The third one is 
PERFORMANCE, which is simply the average of the SCOREMATH and 
SCOREWORD for each student. 
 
QPij is made up of a student’s mother’s and father’s highest level of educational 
attainment dummy variables, whether the student takes extracurricular courses or 
lessons, and whether the parents have met the teacher in the past six months. Public 
school teachers are supposed to meet with parents at least once every four months, 
but meetings can occur more frequently if the parents and teachers are active 
attendants of school committee (BP3) and other similar meetings. On the other 
hand, there are parents who do not see their children’s teachers for years or, in some 
extreme cases, ever. The purpose of meetings is to maintain communication and 
exchange information that can be beneficial to student performance. Thus, QPij = 
[FATHER UNSPECIFIED EDUCATION; FATHER DID NOT COMPLETE 
SIXTH GRADE; FATHER COMPLETED SIXTH GRADE; FATHER 
COMPLETED JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL; FATHER COMPLETED HIGH 
SCHOOL OR ABOVE; MOTHER UNSPECIFIED EDUCATION; MOTHER DID 
NOT COMPLETE SIXTH GRADE; MOTHER COMPLETED SIXTH GRADE; 
MOTHER COMPLETED JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL; MOTHER COMPLETED 
HIGH SCHOOL OR ABOVE; TEACHER HAS MET PARENTS; STUDENT 
TAKES EXTRA COURSES].  
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QTj is the teachers’ characteristics. ABS_RATE_TOTAL, is the teacher absence 
rate; AVG_EXPERIENCE and AVG_EXPERIENCE_SQ are the average years of 
experience of teachers in the school and the average years of experience squared; 
PROP_PERM_TEACHER is the proportion of permanent teachers in the school 
which, in public schools, usually means civil servants; 
PROP_TEACHER_OTHJOBS is the proportion of teachers who have other 
occupations; PROP_FEMALE_TEACHER is the proportion of female teachers; 
PROP_TEACHER_DISS is the proportion of teachers who are dissatisfied with 
their salary; PROP_TEACHER_ABOVE_SPG is the proportion of teachers who 
have teacher training beyond secondary high school. In Indonesia, teacher training 
starts at secondary high school, or Teacher Training Schools (SPGs). People who 
wish to become teachers go to SPGs instead of regular high schools. Teachers who 
are trained only at SPGs are only licensed to teach in elementary schools. Although 
government regulations require teachers to have at least attended SPGs, in some 
parts of the country this regulation is waived due to teacher shortages.8 Thus, 
QTj=[ABSENCE RATE TOTAL; AVERAGE EXPERIENCE; AVERAGE 
EXPERIENCE SQUARED; PROP PERMANENT TEACHER; PROP TEACHER 
WITH OTHER JOBS; PROP FEMALE TEACHER; PROP TEACHER 
DISSATISFIED; PROP TEACHER ABOVE SECONDARY LEVEL 
EDUCATION] 
 
QSj is the condition and characteristics of the school. MAIN_LANG_INDO indicates 
whether the official school language is Indonesian; MAIN_LANG_DIFF indicates 
whether the official school language is different from the mother tongue of the majority 
of students; AVG_CLASS_SIZE is the average size of the classes where the test was 
administered (in this case fourth grade); STUDENT_PER_TEACHER is the student-
teacher ratio in the school and STUDENT_PER_TEACHER_SQ its square (so it is not 
only for the fourth grade); LIBRARY_AVAIL indicates whether there is a functional 
library at the school; binomial variables to indicate whether the school has the following 
infrastructure: paved road, toilets, electricity, a playground, maps and charts, and a staff 
room; TEACHER_MEET, which is also a binomial variable to indicate whether there 
has been a staff meeting in the past 6 months. So QSj=[MAIN SCHOOL LANGUAGE 
INDONESIAN; MAIN SCHOOL LANGUAGE DIFFERENT THAN STUDENT; 
AVERAGE CLASS SIZE; STUDENT PER TEACHER RATIO; STUDENT PER 
TEACHER RATIO SQUARED; LIBRARY AVAILABLE; PAVED ROAD WITHIN 
SCHOOL; PAVED ROAD ONE HUNDRED METERS FROM SCHOOL; PAVED 
ROAD ONE KM FROM SCHOOL; HAS TOILET; HAS ELECTRICITY; HAS 
MAPS; HAS PLAYGROUND; HAS STAFFROOM; TEACHER MEETING 
REGULARLY]. 
 
FSj is the fees related to the school. It has three variables: AMOUNT_RECEIVED, 
which is the amount of government funds received by the school in the 2001/2002 
school year, measured in millions of rupiah; TOTAL_FEES, which consists of exam 
fees and other fees charged to each student, normalized to monthly average in 
thousands of rupiah; and MONTHLY_BP_FEE, which is some form of compulsory 
membership fee for parents to take part in the BP3, which is comprised of parents and 
                                                
8 Recently, SPGs were abolished as the requirement for teachers has been increased to a 2-year 
teaching diploma.  
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teachers, and its duty is to oversee school activities. The BP3 fee is normalized to a 
monthly average in thousands of rupiah. Thus FSj=[GOVERNMENT TRANSFER; 
TOTAL FEES CHARGED TO STUDENTS; MONTHLY BP FEE]. 
 
In theory, one might expect any effects of transfers and fees to be mediated by the 
teacher and school quality variables, if the fees affect student performance primarily 
by allowing purchase of better inputs into the educational process. We include fees 
however, because some dimensions of quality are without doubt unobservable or at 
least immeasurable, and fees seem likely to correlate with these dimensions and 
therefore with student performance. Furthermore, including the three sources of 
funds separately may provide a test of which type of accountability is most effective 
in inducing strong performance by the school - accountability to government 
agencies, to individual “clients”, or to school organizations.9 
  
B. The Possibilities of Bias 
 
Other studies have documented potential bias-generating issues in this kind of 
investigation. One potential bias stems from the potential correlation of student 
performance with unobservables. One such unobservable is the student’s ability to 
learn or educability. This variable is difficult to measure accurately, even if some sort 
of aptitude test is available (it is not in our data), but it is certainly an important 
element in the educational production function. Omitting it will therefore introduce 
bias if the variable is correlated with other regressors, such as parental education or 
income (Graddy & Stevens, 2003). To try to address this problem, we include several 
variables that are likely to correlate with student educability - parental educational 
attainment; whether the student takes extracurricular lessons; and parental attention 
to the student’s progress. 
 
Various potential sources of endogeneity could bias our econometric results. One 
such source is parental choice of school for their children. If that choice (or the 
applicants’ choice of school) is correlated with characteristics that are observed by 
parents or school administrators but not by the econometrician, then the analysis 
may incorrectly attribute to the school or teachers’ performance effects that actually 
stem from individual characteristics. Kingdon (1996) attempted to control for 
selectivity of students into private and public schools in India and found that the 
selectivity term was only weakly significant when there were no controls for any 
school or teacher variables. It is possible that this result would also hold in the 
Indonesian context; however, we know of no studies testing this proposition. 
 
Endogenous student assignment to classes could similarly be a source of bias, if 
students are assigned based on unmeasured characteristics correlated with 
performance. As already mentioned above, however, most schools surveyed only have 
a single fourth-grade cohort. In any event, our data on teacher characteristics are not 
class-specific, but are averages for each school. While taking averages will reduce our 
ability to distinguish teacher effects from noise, it should eliminate this potential 
source of bias. 
 
                                                
9 See World Bank (2003) for a summary of different mechanisms of accountability in service delivery. 
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Another potential source of bias is the possibility that parents enroll their children in 
extracurricular classes or tutoring - so that the measured public-schooling inputs do 
not capture all formal educational inputs. The direction of this bias is not easy to 
predict; poor-performing students may be sent to tutoring to get remedial attention, 
but it is also possible that high-ability students with motivated parents receive 
tutoring to compensate for inadequacies in public schooling. In this case, we did 
collect information on tutoring from the students, which should help to reduce this 
source of bias. Nevertheless, we recognize that this variable also serves as a proxy for 
parental income - in that only parents who are relatively affluent can afford to enroll 
their children in extracurricular classes - and as an indirect measurement of parental 
attention. So while including this variable seems important, interpreting it will 
require caution. 
 
In summary, in light of the bias issues we have mentioned above and the measures we 
have taken to accommodate them, we are reasonably confident of the robustness of 
our results. 
 
C. Data Summary of Math Scores 
 
In this section, we divide the student test scores into quartiles and look at the 
characteristics of the schools, students and teachers of each quartile. Appendix 2 
documents this exercise for math scores. The highest score in the math test was 100 
while the lowest score was 0. The actual length of the math test varied from 5 to 21 
minutes, based on the amount of time the students spent finishing the test. 
Unsurprisingly, and consistent with evidence from other countries, this new evidence 
from Indonesia shows that the average level of education of fathers increases with the 
test-score quartiles (from lowest to highest). In the first quartile, most fathers only 
have a primary school certificate, while in the fourth quartile most fathers have at 
least a high school certificate. In addition, the proportion of fathers who have a high 
school certificate continues to rise in higher quartiles. In the bottom quartile, only 
17% of fathers have a high school certificate, while in the top quartile 40% of fathers 
do. The same pattern is true for mothers: although the majority of mothers in all 
quartiles completed only primary school, the percentage of mothers who have a high 
school certificate increased from 10% in the first quartile to 29% in the fourth 
quartile. 
 
Other variables which correlate with performance include gender, infrastructure, 
source of funds and parental involvement variables. Girls are over represented among 
high scorers: 56% of students in the highest quartile are girls, compared with 45% in 
the lowest quartile. The proportion of female teaching staff also increases with 
student performance, from 58% in the first quartile to 65% in the fourth quartile. 
While some indicators of the quality of school facilities do not vary much across 
quartiles, others such as the existence of a library and toilets also increase between 
the first quartile and the fourth quartile. In addition, although the amount of 
transfers received from the government is relatively equal for all quartiles of students, 
the schools of higher-quartile students charge higher BP3 and school fees. Finally, 
more parents of the children who performed better in the math test had met teachers 
in the two to six months prior to the test. 
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D. Data Summary of Dictation Scores 
 
Appendix 3 summarizes the dictation test scores. Those scores range from 0 to 100, 
while the time that students took to complete the test ranged between 2 and 39 
minutes. The findings on (bivariate) correlates of dictation test scores are broadly 
consistent with the findings for the math test, in terms of trends in the movement 
between quartiles. The main difference is in government transfers: schools with more 
children who performed well in the dictation test received significantly more funds. 
Schools of students in the higher quartiles are also more likely to have electricity. 
 
Another finding from the data is that students in higher quartiles attend schools with 
fewer teachers who have other occupations. The average class size (for fourth-grade 
classes) and the pupil-teacher ratio (for the school) both show that, in terms of 
simple correlations, students whose scores are in higher quartiles are in schools that 
have more students in a class or, other words, more students per teacher. 
 
E. Private School Performance 
 
Although we focus on public primary schools, it is useful to compare their results with 
private schools. Our data on private school students consist of 319 students from 35 
schools. The comparison between both schools for both tests is in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. A Comparison of Performance between Private and 
Public Primary Schools 
 Test Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Private School      
 Mathematics 72.53 22.18 7.7 100 
 Dictation 86.28 20.87 0 100 
      
Public School      
 Mathematics 70.08 21.21 0 100 
 Dictation 84.56 21.93 0 100 
      
Mean Difference Mathematics 2.45*    
  Dictation 1.72    
note: * significant at 5%. 
 
On average, students in private schools perform better than their counterparts in 
public schools, although the only significant difference is in math performance. 
Furthermore, the mean differences are only slight, less than 3 points on a 0-100 scale. 
This indicates that there is no significant difference in performance between public 
and private schools. The limited number of observations however, prevent us from 
analyzing private schools further. 
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V. RESULTS 
 
 
To estimate the model, we used OLS regression with the standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity using school clusters. The estimations were carried out for each 
test type. The results of the estimations are provided in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Correlates of Student Performance OLS Results with Robust Error 
 Mathematics Dictation Average Performance 
 Score Score Score 
Sex       
Female 0.085** 0.282*** 0.107*** 
 [0.041] [0.094] [0.033] 
Parents Quality and Attention       
Teacher has met parents -0.013 -0.032 0.005 
 [0.041] [0.087] [0.035] 
Father unspecified education 0.061 0.27 0.11 
 [0.111] [0.233] [0.105] 
Father did not complete sixth grade 0.08 0.406 0.22* 
 [0.118] [0.358] [0.114] 
Father completed sixth grade 0.078 0.335 0.172 
 [0.119] [0.242] [0.110] 
Father completed junior high school 0.004 0.302 0.087 
 [0.147] [0.256] [0.144] 
Father completed high school or above 0.093 0.314 0.148 
 [0.129] [0.269] [0.124] 
Mother unspecified education 0.167 0.042 0.146 
 [0.118] [0.172] [0.098] 
Mother did not complete sixth grade 0.137 0.333* 0.142 
 [0.152] [0.194] [0.099] 
Mother completed sixth grade 0.267** 0.086 0.183* 
 [0.130] [0.167] [0.107] 
Mother completed junior high school 0.285** 0.25 0.224** 
 [0.136] [0.182] [0.112] 
Mother completed high school or above 0.33*** 0.348** 0.255** 
 [0.123] [0.165] [0.103] 
Student takes extra courses 0.002 0.036 0.019 
 [0.042] [0.080] [0.039] 
Teacher Quality and Condition       
School teacher absence rate  -0.072** 0.06 -0.046 
 [0.031] [0.083] [0.029] 
Average teacher experience -0.899 -1.547 -0.78 
 [0.576] [1.935] [0.591] 
Average teacher experience squared 0.201* 0.297 0.156 
 [0.118] [0.382] [0.120] 
Proportion of permanent teachers -0.426** 1.295* -0.119 
 [0.172] [0.711] [0.177] 
Proportion of teachers with other jobs -0.061** -0.028 -0.048* 
 [0.030] [0.058] [0.026] 
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 Mathematics Dictation 
Average 
Performance 
 Score Score Score 
Proportion of female teachers -0.156** 0.066 -0.076 
 [0.060] [0.130] [0.054] 
Proportion of dissatisfied teachers -0.002 -0.03 -0.006 
 [0.014] [0.036] [0.014] 
Proportion of teachers with above secondary-level education -0.021 0.007 0.009 
 [0.052] [0.112] [0.061] 
School Condition and Characteristics       
Main school language Indonesian 0.133* 0.761*** 0.252*** 
 [0.074] [0.205] [0.069] 
Main school language different than student -0.028 -0.329*** -0.097** 
 [0.049] [0.118] [0.040] 
Average class size -0.143 -0.28 -0.173* 
 [0.108] [0.205] [0.095] 
Pupil-teacher ratio 1.807*** 0.971 1.495** 
 [0.679] [1.749] [0.610] 
Pupil-teacher ratio squared -0.282** -0.154 -0.231** 
 [0.108] [0.283] [0.097] 
Paved road within school grounds 0.074 -0.456 -0.025 
 [0.140] [0.332] [0.135] 
Paved road less than one hundred meters from school 0.134 -0.515 0.001 
 [0.128] [0.328] [0.127] 
Paved road less than one kilometer from school 0.118 -0.637* -0.022 
 [0.131] [0.324] [0.141] 
Library available at school 0.008 -0.152 -0.011 
 [0.057] [0.169] [0.060] 
Has toilets 0.173** 0.253 0.158** 
 [0.080] [0.196] [0.075] 
Has electricity 0.084 0.057 0.084 
 [0.086] [0.184] [0.081] 
Has maps -0.135 -0.767 -0.252 
 [0.146] [0.511] [0.173] 
Has a playground -0.168** -0.462*** -0.198*** 
 [0.065] [0.173] [0.065] 
Has a staff room 0.001 0.329 0.084 
 [0.086] [0.204] [0.078] 
Regular teacher meetings 0.29** 0.684** 0.308** 
 [0.121] [0.335] [0.139] 
Fees       
Government transfer -0.004 0.019 -0.002 
 [0.012] [0.034] [0.012] 
Total student fees -0.001 -0.01 -0.006 
 [0.013] [0.032] [0.012] 
Monthly BP3 fee 0.038 -0.037 0.037 
 [0.026] [0.045] [0.026] 
 
 
 
 
 SMERU Research Institute, December 2004 16
 
 
 Mathematics Dictation 
Average 
Performance 
 Score Score Score 
District Dummies       
Pekanbaru 0.477*** 1.304** 0.515*** 
 [0.159] [0.541] [0.181] 
Rejang Lebong 0.33** 1.164** 0.361** 
 [0.157] [0.513] [0.179] 
Bandung 0.214 1.377** 0.304* 
 [0.156] [0.540] [0.177] 
Magelang 0.189 0.572 0.169 
 [0.190] [0.554] [0.191] 
Surakarta 0.504*** 1.419** 0.474** 
 [0.168] [0.574] [0.190] 
Tuban 0.408*** 1.602*** 0.524*** 
 [0.149] [0.538] [0.168] 
Pasuruan 0.406** 1.485** 0.432** 
 [0.164] [0.584] [0.185] 
Cilegon 0.18 1.141* 0.303* 
 [0.147] [0.591] [0.182] 
Lombok Tengah 0.036 0.838 0.236 
 [0.193] [0.526] [0.200] 
    
Constant 1.31 4.225 2.206** 
 [1.111] [3.020] [1.020] 
    
Observations 1089 1089 1089 
R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.19 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Non-dummy variables are in log form       
 
 
Estimation using all three test results shows that female students performed 
significantly better on our test, confirming the unconditional relationship revealed in 
the quartile comparisons. The education level of fathers, while it has positive 
coefficients, does not significantly correlate to performance. By contrast, the 
education level of mothers appears to matter: Students whose mother completed any 
level of education performed significantly better in math than students with illiterate 
mothers, and those whose mothers completed high school performed significantly 
better on the dictation test. This finding is consistent with the existence of a strong 
inter-generational education link found in many other countries, although there is 
still controversy on its reasons between education spillover (e.g. Chevalier, 2003) 
and genetics (e.g. Black et al., 2003). 
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Several teacher characteristics correlate with performance. First, teacher absence 
significantly and negatively correlates with student performance on the math test, 
though not on the dictation test.10 Remembering that the regressor is the average 
absence rate for the school, the effect of absence of the child’s own teacher would 
presumably be much larger, although there were not enough observations over time 
to calculate the absence rate for 4th-grade teachers with any precision. This suggests 
that the absence of teachers from math-related subjects must be taken seriously. It 
may also point to a difference in the teacher’s role in developing a child’s 
mathematical and language skills. The dictation test only consisted of sentences 
being dictated, and students have more opportunities to acquire language skills (less 
so for math skills) outside of school, from parents and others. Because of the lack of 
data on teacher absence rates in the past, this is one of the first studies to verify 
empirically a link between teacher absenteeism and student performance.11 
 
Other teacher variables also emerge as significant correlates. One is teacher 
experience: the significant quadratic teacher experience term in the math regressions 
suggests that experience may have an increasing marginal return over at least some 
range. Another, more ambiguous relationship is with a teacher’s contract status. The 
proportion of permanent teachers in schools is significant in both regressions, but 
with opposite effects: it negatively correlates with math scores but positively 
(although weakly) correlates with dictation scores. Hence, the overall correlation of 
the proportion of permanent teachers with average performance is insignificant. 
 
The outside employment of teachers also appears to matter. Attending a school with 
a higher proportion of teachers with a second job negatively correlates with math 
performance. (The correlation with dictation scores is also negative, but 
insignificant.) One obvious possibility is that this relationship is causal; teachers who 
moonlight cannot concentrate fully on teaching and hence do not teach their 
students as well. Other explanations are also possible, but it is a useful step forward to 
establish a correlation. 
 
Finally, the proportion of female teachers in a school has a negative and significant 
correlation with math performance. (The correlation with dictation performance is 
insignificant.) A simplistic interpretation of our results would be that females make 
better students but poorer teachers in math-related subjects, but the story is more 
complex than that. In Appendix 4, we segregate male and female students and run 
math performance regressions separately for each sub-sample. The results show that 
the proportion of female teachers does not correlate with the performance of female 
students but negatively and significantly correlates with male students’ performance. 
We leave the investigation of this phenomenon for future studies. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 This is in accordance with Johnstone & Jiyono (1983) study in section III. 
11 Others include Habyarimana et al. (2004) for Zambia and Kremer et al. (2004) for India. 
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We turn now to school conditions and characteristics. First, the language used in the 
school was correlated with test performance. Students at schools that use 
Indonesian12 as their official language of instruction perform significantly better in all 
three dependent variables, even with the various controls that we have included. It is 
not surprising that these students performed better on the dictation test, given that it 
was conducted in Indonesian, but they also achieved significantly higher math scores. 
Along the same lines, students attending schools where instruction is in a different 
language from their mother tongue also received significantly lower scores on the 
dictation test. Math scores were however, not influenced by this second language 
variable; presumably because of the universality of numerical symbols. 
 
Another set of school variables relates to class size. One such measure that we 
included is the average fourth-grade class size. This variable has a negative and 
significant coefficient in the total-score regression (although the effect is 
insignificant for the separate math and dictation regressions), providing some support 
for the presumption that large classes have detrimental effects on student 
performance. A second measure is the pupil-teacher ratio for the school, calculated 
based on the total number of teaching staff (both permanent and contract teachers) 
and total enrollment reported by the principal. Surprisingly, the pupil-teacher ratio 
has a positive correlation with math test scores (and overall performance), while its 
square has a negative correlation. Simple calculations using the point estimates 
suggest that the student-teacher ratio that is associated with the highest overall 
performance is 25 - which is slightly higher than the actual average ratio for any of the 
student-performance quartiles reported in Appendix 2. This result is at odds with the 
usual assumption that lower pupil-teacher ratios always improve learning outcomes. 
 
A third set of school variables measures the accessibility to the school. The 
accessibility measure included in the regressions is proximity to a paved road, which 
may serve as a summary measure for the cost of transportation and travel to the 
school. This variable gives mixed results, for example, students at more accessible 
(or less remote) schools have higher average math scores, but lower average 
dictation scores. 
 
Fourth, in terms of school facilities, students at schools with at least one functioning 
toilet performed better on the math test. Interestingly, the effect is significant for 
girls, but not for boys. This is consistent with evidence from Bangladesh and 
elsewhere, where it has been argued that availability of toilets is particularly 
important in increasing the number of girls enrolled and their educational attainment 
(World Bank, 2001). The other significant facility variable is the availability of a 
playground, which is negatively correlated with performance. Since we do not have 
any data to further investigate the negativity of having a playground, we leave this for 
future studies. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
12 The official language of Indonesia, sometimes also referred to as Bahasa Indonesia. 
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Finally, in terms of school management, students at schools with recent staff 
meetings received higher scores on both the math and dictation tests. This result is 
simply suggestive at this point, but one interpretation might be that schools managed 
more actively by their principals - or, alternatively, those managed in a more 
participatory way - tend to perform better. 
 
Interestingly, none of the finance variables (transfers and fees) yielded significant 
coefficients. This means that although money is important, it is more important to 
ensure that it is spent on things that are significant for improving student 
performance.13 
                                                
13 Toyamah and Usman (2004) showed that 95% of the government budget for education is earmarked 
to pay teachers’ salaries, leaving virtually nothing for other expenditures. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 
This paper estimates empirically the determinants of student performance in public 
schools in Indonesia, using a nationally representative sample of fourth graders. We 
modeled performance using a common firm production function model, and ran three 
sets of regressions using three different dependent variables: each student’s math 
score, dictation score, and the combined average score. The data for this study came 
from a survey of schools in ten districts in eight provinces, selected through stratified 
clustered random sampling at the national level, which was conducted by the 
SMERU Research Institute and World Bank in 2002-2003. 
 
All three sets of estimations yielded broadly similar results. One interesting finding is 
that higher teacher absence significantly correlates with poorer student performance 
in the math test and the average score. Because prior studies lacked access to data on 
teacher absence in Indonesia, this correlation has not been observed before. While 
our data does not allow us to establish causality, this result is consistent with the view 
that teacher absenteeism is either a cause or a symptom of problems related to service 
delivery in the education sector. A companion paper using this dataset explores in 
detail the extent and possible causes of teacher absenteeism, with a view to 
suggesting policies that might reduce the absenteeism rate (Rogers et al., 2004) and 
increase the quality of schooling. 
 
Among student-specific variables, the significant predictors of performance are the 
child’s sex - with girls scoring higher - and the education levels of parents. The 
positive correlation with parental education is consistent with results from other 
countries, but still useful in underlining the future spillovers from investment in the 
human capital of one generation. 
 
In general, the teacher and school characteristics variables which correlate with 
performance met our expectations, such as the negative coefficients of the proportion 
of teachers who have other occupations, class size, and the different languages at 
school and at home, and the positive coefficients of functioning toilets. There are 
however, other interesting results, such as the negative correlation between a 
student’s dictation ability and proportion of permanent teachers and the mixed 
results on the coefficients of facilities variables like proximity to paved roads and the 
existence of playgrounds. 
 
Another result that should be reiterated is the non-monotonicity of the correlation 
with pupil-teacher ratio. If we could interpret this result causally, it would suggest 
that too few students in a class might be as detrimental as too many, and that the 
optimal ratio is in between. While intriguing, this result clearly requires further 
exploration. It is possible that the effect of pupil-teacher ratios on performance is 
actually monotonically negative, but that low ratios are correlated with unmeasured 
variables that worsen student performance. We have tried to account for such 
variables here, which include the remoteness of the school, but we cannot guarantee 
that we have succeeded fully. 
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Another interesting result is the insignificance of the fees variables. This implies that 
any effect of financial support in improving student performance is mediated entirely 
by the school and teacher characteristics variables included in the regression. Of 
course, it makes sense that money should be important if, and only if, it is used to 
enhance the quantity and quality of schools and teachers; but what is interesting is 
the relatively small number of regressors that apparently captured these quantity and 
quality dimensions effectively. 
 
By contrast, it is also surprising to see that indicators like the proportion of teachers above 
SPG is insignificant in all specifications and the proportion of teachers dissatisfied with 
their salaries is also insignificant. This means that teachers who are dissatisfied with their 
salaries provide the same level of input to student performance as the satisfied ones. In 
addition, teachers who have training above the SPG level do not provide any significantly 
better improvement in student performance than those only of SPG level or below. 
 
Our results highlight several policies for raising student achievement that may 
warrant further investigation. One is improving school facilities, and not just those 
directly related to pedagogy. Girls at schools with functioning toilets have 
significantly higher scores, in a result that echoes findings in South Asia linking 
toilet facilities to the number of girls enrolled and their educational attainment. 
Second, it is likely that reducing teacher absence would raise student performance. We 
recognize that poor performance and high absenteeism may both stem from the same 
underlying factors, such as poor school management and unmotivated students, but 
the effect persists even when we include proxies for those factors. Third, reducing the 
incidence of teachers’ outside employment may improve their students’ performance. 
Fourth, there is no robust evidence, after controlling for absence,14 that schools with 
more permanent teachers (as opposed to contract teachers) perform better. This 
finding might encourage experimentation with greater use of contract teachers, on 
the condition that their high absenteeism rate is significantly lowered. Finally, the 
results provide some evidence that pupil-teacher ratios below the current average 
level are not associated with better performance, ceteris paribus; it is worth exploring 
further the possibility that educational resources might better be spent elsewhere. 
 
This analysis is a first attempt at understanding the degree and sources of variation in 
student performance in Indonesia, and further work is clearly necessary. First, there are a 
number of other variables that should be tested for correlation with performance once 
the data become available. For example, other student-specific variables that seem likely 
to improve performance include: the student’s time allocation (to work and study) 
outside school (even if this is somewhat endogenous); parental financial or tutoring 
assistance for students; and the number of siblings and birth order. Second, our data were 
cross-sectional, it would be ideal to be able to retest the same students and generate a 
panel dataset, so that we could investigate the correlates of educational value-added. 
 
As we have reiterated above, there is still much work to be done before we can obtain 
an adequate knowledge of how to increase the quality of education in Indonesia. We 
hope, however, that this paper has made a useful initial contribution. 
                                                
14 Non-regular teachers have higher absenteeism rates than regular teachers in Indonesia (Rogers et al., 2004). 
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Appendix 1 
Variables Description 
Dependent Variables   
scoremath score in mathematics test 
scoreword score in words test 
performance average score of mathematics and words test 
  
Sex   
female dummy of sex. 0 = male, 1 = female 
  
Parents Quality and Attention   
meet parents dummy of whether teachers have met parents within the past 6 months 
FE_Cannot_Read dummy that has the value of 1 if the father cannot read 
FE_Unspecified_Edu_Level dummy that has the value of 1 if the father education level is unknown 
FE_Not_Comp_SixGr dummy that has the value of 1 if the father education level is below primary level 
FE_Comp_SixGr dummy that has the value of 1 if the father finished primary level education 
FE_Comp_Jun_School dummy that has the value of 1 if the father finished junior high level education 
FE_HS_above dummy that has the value of 1 if the father finished high school or above 
ME_Cannot_Read dummy that has the value of 1 if the mother cannot read 
ME_Unspecified_Edu_Level dummy that has the value of 1 if the mother education level is unknown 
ME_Not_Comp_SixGr dummy that has the value of 1 if the mother education level is below primary level 
ME_Comp_SixGr dummy that has the value of 1 if the mother finished primary level education 
ME_Comp_Jun_School dummy that has the value of 1 if the mother finished junior high level education 
ME_HS_above dummy that has the value of 1 if the mother finished high school or above 
extra_courses dummy of whether the student is taking extracurricular courses 
  
Teacher Quality and Condition   
abs_rate_total total absence rates for teachers in a school 
avg_experience average experience of teachers in a school in years 
prop_perm_teacher proportion of permanent teachers in a school 
prop_teacher_othjobs proportion of teachers who have other occupations 
prop_female_teacher proportion of female teachers 
prop_teacher_diss proportion of teachers who are dissatisfied with salary 
prop_teacher_above_SPG proportion of teachers who are above SPG 
  
School Condition and Characteristics   
main_lang_indo dummy of whether school official language is Indonesian 
main_lang_diff dummy of whether school official language is different from majority of students' mother tongue 
avg_class_size average size of fourth grade class in a school 
student_per_teacher student per teacher ratio in a school 
paved_road_within dummy of whether there is paved road within school complex 
paved_road_one_hun_met dummy of whether there is paved road within one hundred meters from school 
paved_road_one_km dummy of whether there is paved road between one hundred meters and one kilometer 
library_avail dummy of whether a library is available in school 
has_toilet dummy of whether school has one functioning toilet 
has_electric dummy of whether school has access to electricity 
has_maps dummy of whether school has maps and charts 
has_playground dummy of whether school has playground  
has_staffroom dummy of whether school has staffroom 
teacher_meet dummy of whether staff meeting has occurred within the past 6 months 
Fees   
amount_received amount of government transfer received in 2001/2002 
total_fees average monthly fees for exam and other fees charged to students 
monthly_BP_fee average monthly BP fee 
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Appendix 2 
Descriptive Characteristics of Variables Based on Math Scores Quartiles 
Variable Math Scores 
      
 Quartiles of Math Scores Total 
 1st quart 2nd quart 3rd quart 4th quart  
      
scoremath      
Mean 40.6957 65.24321 80.2319 94.05466 70.07841 
Standard Deviation 13.18389 4.528178 3.815454 4.978185 21.21133 
            
female 0.4522059 0.5 0.5073529 0.5677656 0.5068871 
            
meet parents 0.5551471 0.625 0.6580882 0.6776557 0.6290174 
FE_Unspeci~l 0.1507353 0.0882353 0.1286765 0.0769231 0.1111111 
FE_Cant_Re~r 0.1176471 0.0625 0.0808824 0.0695971 0.0826446 
FE_Not_Com~r 0.0477941 0.0294118 0.0147059 0.007326 0.0247934 
FE_Comp_Si~r 0.3566176 0.4080882 0.3419118 0.2747253 0.3452709 
FE_Comp_Ju~l 0.1580882 0.1544118 0.1617647 0.1684982 0.1606979 
FE_HS_above 0.1691176 0.2573529 0.2720588 0.4029304 0.2754821 
ME_Unspeci~l 0.2095588 0.0845588 0.1580882 0.1135531 0.1414141 
ME_Cant_Re~r 0.1397059 0.0955882 0.0919118 0.0915751 0.1046832 
ME_Not_Com~r 0.0551471 0.0404412 0.0257353 0.003663 0.0312213 
ME_Comp_Si~r 0.3823529 0.4375 0.3897059 0.3589744 0.3921028 
ME_Comp_Ju~l 0.1066176 0.1617647 0.1580882 0.1391941 0.1414141 
ME_HS_above 0.1066176 0.1801471 0.1764706 0.2930403 0.1891644 
extra_cour~s 0.1066176 0.1397059 0.1544118 0.2124542 0.1533517 
            
abs_rate_t~l 0.2194447 0.2004129 0.176125 0.1929663 0.1972333 
abs_rate_v~1 0.2127027 0.199383 0.1860406 0.1952362 0.1983378 
abs_rate_v~2 0.2261866 0.2014427 0.1662094 0.1906964 0.1961288 
avg_experi~e 17.42457 18.13212 18.40627 18.30286 18.06667 
prop_perm_~r 0.9328064 0.931025 0.9045338 0.9035799 0.917973 
prop_teac~bs 0.415204 0.4516252 0.4487833 0.4395701 0.4387964 
prop_femal~r 0.5806431 0.6364867 0.6414273 0.6523475 0.6277488 
prop_teac~ss 0.3627931 0.3283378 0.298013 0.2958649 0.3212289 
prop_teach~G 0.6354897 0.6605455 0.6934309 0.6787334 0.6670606 
            
main_lang_~o 0.9816176 0.9669118 0.9595588 0.981685 0.9724518 
main_lang_~f 0.8235294 0.7867647 0.6838235 0.6776557 0.7428834 
avg_class_~e 32.70772 31.60846 33.12684 35.08608 33.13407 
student_pe~r 23.89514 23.27985 21.89617 22.35432 22.85591 
paved_road~n 0.125 0.1911765 0.2573529 0.2710623 0.2112029 
paved_road~t 0.5404412 0.5551471 0.5514706 0.4945055 0.5353535 
pav~d_one_km 0.2352941 0.1948529 0.1470588 0.1941392 0.1928375 
pav~e_one_km 0.0992647 0.0588235 0.0441176 0.040293 0.0606061 
library_av~l 0.6102941 0.6691176 0.6838235 0.7655678 0.6822773 
has_toilet 0.7977941 0.8860294 0.8897059 0.9267399 0.8751148 
has_electric 0.8125 0.8455882 0.9007353 0.8681319 0.8567493 
has_maps 0.9301471 0.9080882 0.9191176 0.9120879 0.9173554 
has_playgr~d 0.9411765 0.9264706 0.9411765 0.9230769 0.932966 
has_staffr~m 0.875 0.875 0.8933824 0.9194139 0.8907254 
teacher_meet 0.9595588 0.9338235 0.9485294 0.952381 0.9485767 
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amount_rec~d 4.289671 3.508692 3.876523 4.136292 3.952963 
total_fees 12.33474 17.50487 19.84963 20.78642 17.62182 
monthly_BP~e 2.752328 3.496936 4.701562 5.764805 4.180364 
            
Pekanbaru 0.0441176 0.0955882 0.0919118 0.0989011 0.0826446 
Rejang_Leb~g 0.1323529 0.1433824 0.0845588 0.043956 0.1010101 
Bandung 0.0625 0.0698529 0.0992647 0.0989011 0.0826446 
Magelang 0.0772059 0.0735294 0.0845588 0.0952381 0.0826446 
Surakarta 0.0110294 0.0367647 0.1213235 0.1611722 0.0826446 
Tuban 0.0588235 0.0845588 0.1176471 0.1062271 0.0918274 
Pasuruan 0.0625 0.1286765 0.1727941 0.1611722 0.1313131 
Cilegon 0.2463235 0.1691176 0.1066176 0.1025641 0.1561065 
Lombok_Ten~h 0.1544118 0.0845588 0.0477941 0.0805861 0.0918274 
Gowa 0.1507353 0.1139706 0.0735294 0.0512821 0.097337 
Note: for dummy and district variables, the numbers in each quartile show proportion.   
 
 SMERU Research Institute, December 2004 29
 
Appendix 3 
Descriptive Characteristics of Variables Based on Dictation Scores Quartiles 
Variable Dictation Scores 
      
 Quartiles of Dictation Scores Total 
 1st quart 2nd quart 3rd quart 4th quart  
      
scoreword      
Mean 54.83047 88.27614 95.76185 99.32845 84.5628
Standard Deviation 25.94424 2.965011 1.599187 1.191486 21.93969
            
female 0.4264706 0.4742647 0.5514706 0.5750916 0.5068871
            
meet parents 0.5955882 0.6286765 0.6213235 0.6703297 0.6290174
FE_Unspeci~l 0.0992647 0.0992647 0.1323529 0.1135531 0.1111111
FE_Cant_Re~r 0.1507353 0.0625 0.0551471 0.0622711 0.0826446
FE_Not_Com~r 0.0330882 0.0330882 0.0220588 0.010989 0.0247934
FE_Comp_Si~r 0.3492647 0.4375 0.2904412 0.3040293 0.3452709
FE_Comp_Ju~l 0.1727941 0.1580882 0.1764706 0.1355311 0.1606979
FE_HS_above 0.1948529 0.2095588 0.3235294 0.3736264 0.2754821
ME_Unspeci~l 0.0992647 0.1286765 0.1727941 0.1648352 0.1414141
ME_Cant_Re~r 0.1360294 0.1029412 0.0992647 0.0805861 0.1046832
ME_Not_Com~r 0.0477941 0.0367647 0.0147059 0.025641 0.0312213
ME_Comp_Si~r 0.4558824 0.4595588 0.3455882 0.3076923 0.3921028
ME_Comp_Ju~l 0.1397059 0.1323529 0.1433824 0.1501832 0.1414141
ME_HS_above 0.1213235 0.1397059 0.2242647 0.2710623 0.1891644
extra_cour~s 0.0625 0.1433824 0.1875 0.2197802 0.1533517
            
abs_rate_t~l 0.19557 0.1956644 0.2045956 0.1931182 0.1972333
abs_rate_v~1 0.1944927 0.2044785 0.2023026 0.1921001 0.1983378
abs_rate_v~2 0.1966474 0.1868503 0.2068886 0.1941362 0.1961288
avg_experi~e 18.18899 18.01937 18.09909 17.95962 18.06667
prop_perm_~r 0.9221383 0.9309075 0.9128812 0.9060091 0.917973
prop_teac~bs 0.4710445 0.4389298 0.4285807 0.4167117 0.4387964
prop_femal~r 0.5666197 0.6207452 0.6512413 0.6722253 0.6277488
prop_teac~ss 0.3710442 0.3259678 0.2907369 0.2972548 0.3212289
prop_teach~G 0.6012502 0.643984 0.6993319 0.723469 0.6670606
            
main_lang_~o 0.9705882 0.9558824 0.9705882 0.992674 0.9724518
main_lang_~f 0.8897059 0.8051471 0.6433824 0.6336996 0.7428834
avg_class_~e 29.94669 30.38787 35.75 36.43956 33.13407
student_pe~r 22.28399 22.30033 23.27491 23.5618 22.85591
paved_road~n 0.1139706 0.1727941 0.2867647 0.2710623 0.2112029
paved_road~t 0.5661765 0.5919118 0.4632353 0.5201465 0.5353535
pav~d_one_km 0.2132353 0.1691176 0.2095588 0.1794872 0.1928375
pav~e_one_km 0.1066176 0.0661765 0.0404412 0.029304 0.0606061
library_av~l 0.6029412 0.6654412 0.7205882 0.7399267 0.6822773
has_toilet 0.8161765 0.875 0.8970588 0.9120879 0.8751148
has_electric 0.7316176 0.8382353 0.9007353 0.956044 0.8567493
has_maps 0.9080882 0.9338235 0.9044118 0.9230769 0.9173554
has_playgr~d 0.9779412 0.9338235 0.9044118 0.9157509 0.932966
has_staffr~m 0.8676471 0.9080882 0.8933824 0.8937729 0.8907254
teacher_meet 0.9191176 0.9669118 0.9558824 0.952381 0.9485767
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amount_rec~d 2.782289 3.997748 4.385346 4.643929 3.952963
total_fees 13.80276 17.45977 18.35625 20.85662 17.62182
monthly_BP~e 2.461918 3.414553 5.40144 5.438919 4.180364
            
Pekanbaru 0.0477941 0.0588235 0.0955882 0.1282051 0.0826446
Rejang_Leb~g 0.1617647 0.1176471 0.0772059 0.047619 0.1010101
Bandung 0.0220588 0.0551471 0.1066176 0.1465201 0.0826446
Magelang 0.1764706 0.0919118 0.0477941 0.014652 0.0826446
Surakarta 0.0110294 0.0441176 0.1507353 0.1245421 0.0826446
Tuban 0.0330882 0.0992647 0.1029412 0.1318681 0.0918274
Pasuruan 0.1066176 0.1727941 0.1360294 0.1098901 0.1313131
Cilegon 0.1433824 0.1617647 0.1470588 0.1721612 0.1561065
Lombok_Ten~h 0.1397059 0.1139706 0.0514706 0.0622711 0.0918274
Gowa 0.1580882 0.0845588 0.0845588 0.0622711 0.097337
Note: for dummy and district variables, the numbers in each quartile show proportion.   
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Appendix 4 
Determinants of Student Performance in Math Test, by Sex 
OLS Results with Robust Errors 
 scoremath  scoremath 
 male only female only 
Parents Quality and Attention     
meet parents 0.046 -0.077 
 [0.058] [0.059] 
FE_Unspecified_Edu_Level 0.121 0.012 
 [0.194] [0.125] 
FE_Not_Comp_SixGr 0.247 0.018 
 [0.373] [0.123] 
FE_Comp_SixGr 0.196 -0.033 
 [0.192] [0.126] 
FE_Comp_Jun_School 0.074 -0.055 
 [0.262] [0.123] 
FE_HS_above 0.165 0.031 
 [0.229] [0.115] 
ME_Unspecified_Edu_Level 0.224 0.136 
 [0.156] [0.158] 
ME_Not_Comp_SixGr 0.102 0.089 
 [0.213] [0.190] 
ME_Comp_SixGr 0.26 0.244 
 [0.168] [0.165] 
ME_Comp_Jun_School 0.263 0.309 
 [0.182] [0.171]* 
ME_HS_above 0.382 0.253 
 [0.162]** [0.156] 
extra_courses -0.046 -0.001 
 [0.039] [0.040] 
   
Teacher Quality and Condition     
ln_abs_rate_total -0.117 -0.033 
 [0.041]*** [0.038] 
ln_avg_experience -2.131 0.109 
 [0.807]*** [0.618] 
ln_avg_exp_sq 0.435 0.014 
 [0.173]** [0.131] 
ln_prop_perm_teacher -0.808 -0.002 
 [0.280]*** [0.217] 
ln_prop_teacher_othjobs -0.105 -0.03 
 [0.051]** [0.035] 
ln_prop_female_teacher -0.181 -0.153 
 [0.074]** [0.093] 
ln_prop_teacher_diss 0.007 -0.014 
 [0.022] [0.016] 
ln_prop_teacher_above_SPG 0.048 -0.067 
 [0.082] [0.048] 
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School Condition and Characteristics   
main_lang_indo 0.05 0.093 
 [0.141] [0.088] 
main_lang_diff -0.002 -0.01 
 [0.070] [0.060] 
ln_avg_class_size -0.357 0.145 
 [0.146]** [0.187] 
ln_student_per_teacher 3.075 1.569 
 [0.876]*** [0.980] 
ln_stu_teach_sq -0.483 -0.258 
 [0.138]*** [0.150]* 
paved_road_within 0.109 -0.056 
 [0.192] [0.148] 
paved_road_one_hun_met 0.115 0.045 
 [0.179] [0.138] 
paved_road_one_km 0.161 -0.006 
 [0.188] [0.141] 
library_avail 0.06 -0.065 
 [0.082] [0.061] 
has_toilet 0.044 0.334 
 [0.117] [0.100]*** 
has_electricity 0.07 0.13 
 [0.122] [0.133] 
has_maps -0.233 -0.097 
 [0.215] [0.137] 
has_playground -0.225 -0.028 
 [0.128]* [0.069] 
has_staffroom 0.077 -0.095 
 [0.120] [0.101] 
teacher_meet 0.502 0.084 
 [0.230]** [0.086] 
   
Fees     
ln_amount_received -0.027 0.008 
 [0.018] [0.013] 
ln_total_fees -0.019 0.008 
 [0.018] [0.018] 
ln_monthly_BP_fee 0.099 -0.038 
 [0.040]** [0.033] 
   
District Dummies     
Pekanbaru 0.513 0.54 
 [0.254]** [0.202]*** 
Rejang_Lebong 0.316 0.401 
 [0.231] [0.193]** 
Bandung 0.132 0.422 
 [0.219] [0.186]** 
Magelang -0.023 0.368 
 [0.284] [0.197]* 
Surakarta 0.422 0.706 
 [0.241]* [0.215]*** 
Tuban 0.392 0.476 
 [0.208]* [0.184]** 
 SMERU Research Institute, December 2004 33
 
District Dummies     
Pasuruan 0.322 0.646 
 [0.228] [0.216]*** 
Cilegon 0.134 0.314 
 [0.196] [0.201] 
Lombok_Tengah 0.122 -0.057 
 [0.323] [0.234] 
   
Constant 1.46 -0.165 
 [1.382] [1.306] 
      
Observations 537 552 
R-squared 0.22 0.19 
Robust standard errors in brackets   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Appendix 5. Test Instruments 
I. Mathematics Test 
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II. Dictation Test 
This test consists of a dictation of these sentences (in Bahasa Indonesia): 
Mengapa tanaman menjadi kering tanpa air?  
Manusia membutuhkan makanan dan air supaya menjadi kuat dan sehat, begitu juga tanaman.  
Tanaman hijau menggunakan air untuk membuat makanannya.  
Tanaman yang tidak mendapat air akan layu dan menjadi kering. 
 
 
